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ABSTRACT

This research replicates with modifications t·he previous
study by Coombes, otto and Stokes (1993) which examines
the economic determinants of the amortisation of
identifiable intangible assets (liAs).

The study focuses

on the published consolidated annual reports of a sample
of top 150 listed Australian companies, ranked by market
capitalisation, as at June 1989, over the period '1989 to
1990, whereas the previous study by Coombes et al. (1993)
concentrates on the top 150 listed Australian companies,·
ranked by market capitalisation, as at 30 June, 1988, over
the period 1986 to 1989.

The empirical evidence of the present research using
contracting theory suggests that management's choice of
amortising liAs depends on whether the investment of these
assets has a 'raluable growth option to generate cash flows
into the companies.

The evidence does not support the

practice of liAs' amortisation in order to reduce covenant
limitations under existing debt contracts and future debt
raisings, and to cause minimisation of political
vulnerability.

Support for the profit-based mangerial

compensation incentives to amortise liAs appears only in
1989, possibly due to the pending ED49 "Accounting for
Identifiable Intangible Assets" issued by the Australian
'1\

Accounting Research Foundation which required systematic
,.,,.
'.

!

amortiaal:ion of liAs.

These findings a<e cons\stent with

.i

thoae of Coombes et al. (1993).
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CHAPTER 1

III'I'RODUCTIOII

1.1

Statement of the Problem

In Australia and overseas countries, there has been a
long-standing controversial discussion of accounting

practice in relation to amortisation of Identifiable

Intangible Assets (IIAs) (see Coombes, Otto & Stokes,
1993; English, 1990; Ferris & Hall, 1989; Kohler, 1989;

Lawson, 1989; Reilly, 1989;

Walk~r.

1992),

According to Australian Accounting Reaearch Foundation

(AARP) (AARF, 199,, p.5), Identifiable Intangible Assets
are those

"~on-monetary

assets without physical substance,

which are capable of being both individually identified
and specifically brought to account, and include but are

not restricted to brand names, copyrights, franchises,
intellectual property, licences,

ma~theads,

patents and

trademarks''; purchased gocdwill is excluded because it is

an unidentified remainder excess of the purchase
consideration in a business acquisition.

The accounting practice of recording IIAs in the annual
reports has increased since the introduction of Accountinq
j

i
'

I

Standards Review Board (ASRB) Approved Accounting Standard
ASRB 1013

~Accounting

for Oooclwill" in April 1988 (ASRB,

2

1988), which has statutory backing.

It requires the

purchased goodwill to be systematically amortised over a
maximum period of 20 years.

Instead of complying with

this statutory requirement, many companies have started to
recognise such liAs as trademarks and broadcasting
licences to reduce, in part or

entir~ly,

the impact of the

requirement for the amortisation of purchased goodwill
(Coombes et al., 1993; Wines & Ferguson, 1993).

In August 1989, AARF attempted to develop an accounting
standard on liAs by issuing an exposure draft, ED49

"Accountinc;J for ldentifiable Intangible Assets" (AARP,
1988) which required IIAs to be amortised by systematic
charges to the profit and loss account over the period
during which benefits are expected to occur.

"Accounting for

Identi~iable

ED49

Intanqible Assets., did not

specify an upptn limit to the period of time over which an
asset may be amortised, but, required detailed disclosures
to be made when the amortisation period exceeded 20 years
(AARF, 1989, p.14-15).

Nevertheless, due to extensive

opposition reflected by 118 submissions to AARF (Coombes
et al., 1993, p.28-29) and "the present lack of consensus
on the suhjtect at a national and international level"
(AARF, 1992, p.1), Australian Accounting Standards Board
(AASB) r.nd Public Sector Accounting Stanclards Board
(PSASB) withdrew 1!:049 "Accounting for Identifiable
Intanv1ible Assets" in March 1992.

To date, there are no

Auotralian accounting regulations or standards in relation

3

Corp~raticns

to liAs, beside

Law (Australian Corporations

& Securities, 1993, section 294 (4)) and Accounting
Standard AASB 1010

11

Accounting for the Revaluation of Non-

current Assets" (AASB, 1993) requiring the directors to
revalue the assets at their replacement cost or their
recoverable amounts at the end of the

finan~ial

year,

Australian companies managers can choose the accounting
treatment of the

amortisati~n

of liAs that they wish to

apply (Coombes eta!., 1993, p.3-4).

1.2

· Purpose of the Research

The aim of this research project is to replicate with

modifications the study done by Coombes et al. (1993) by
investigating the diverse accounting practices, for the

amortisation of IIAs as evident in the published
consolidated annual reports of a sample of top 150
Australian Stock Exchange listed companies over the period
1989 to 1990.

The present research also examines if there

are any changes in the liAs'

amortisat~.on

accounting

policy choice as a result of voluntary compliance before

or after the introduction of I!D49 "Accounting for
Identifiable Intangible Assets" which occurred in Au11ust
1989.

The present research seeks to re-test the hypotheses
examined by Coombes et al. (1993) in which contractin!l

4

theory is used to explain the motivation for management's
choice among the accounting methods for amortising liAs.
This research focuses on whether the growth option nature
of the I I As of the company, the effects of II As' 1 egal

lives, profit-based managerial compensation incentives,
company's indebtedness of existing debt contracts,
company's ability to raise future debt in debt markets or
political vulnerability costs, will affect management's
choice of the amortisation method of liAs in order to
increase or decrease reported profit.

The findings are

then compared with the previous research done by Coombes
et al. (1993) and other previous studies (Carnegie &
Kallio, 1988; Goodwin & Harris, 1991; Wines

~

Ferguson,

1993).

1.3

Organisation of the Research

Chapter 2 summarises previous research and develops the
research hypotheses to be examined in the study.

Chapter

3 presents the research method used 11nd variable

me:tsurement and data collection methods.

Chapter 4

presents test results, and provide!'J a discussion of the
results as well as econometric prc•blems involved in the
present study.

Pinally, Chapter 5 provides the summary

and conclusions, limitations anc!. implications of the

research.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORY & HYPOTHESES

2.1

Literature Review

This section reviews both descriptive and empirical
studies related to accounting policies of IIAs adopted by
the listed Australian companies.
Carnegie & Kallio (1988) examine the annual reports of the
100 largest listed Australian companies, ranked by market
capitalisation, in the financial year 1987.

They examine

the accounting policies adopted for intangible assets
other than goodwill and consider the impact of Accounting
Guidance Release 5 (AGRS) "Accounting for Intangible
Assets Recognised in Accordance with Statement of
Accounting Standards AAS 18 'Accounting for Goodwill'".
The findings show that non-compliance with the guidance
release is continuing, with 35.4% of the sample companies
adopting the practice of zero amortisation for IIAs.

One

half of the sample companies which were not amortising
IIAs provided the reason that amortisation was not
necessary because these assets did not diminish in value.
Goodwin & Harris (1991) examine the annual reports of a
sample of top 90 listed Australian companies (excluding
trust and funds, and mining companies) in the period 1987

6

to 1989, ranked by market c&pitalisation, in order to
identify the accounting policy changes resulting from
compliance with both the Australian Accounting Standard
AAS 18 "Accounting for Goodwill" and ASRB 1013 "Accounting

for Goodwill".

The findings show that, by 1989, only a

few companies in the sample were not complying with the
requirements of AAS 18 "Accounting for Goodwill" and
ASRB 1013 "Accounting for Goodwi 11".

However there is an

increase in the number of companies who record liAs and do
not amortise either in full or in part.

One-third of the

companies recording liAs revalued at either directors'
valuation or an independent valuation, rather than
recording liAs amortised at cost.

The findings suggest

that the management's accounting choices for goodwill and
liAs in most of Australia's largest companies seem to be
influenced by the goodwill accounting standard ASRB 1013

"Accounting for Goodwi 11".

Wines & Ferguson (1993) examine a sample of 150 Australian
Stock Exchange listed companies in the period 1985 to 1989

in order to examine the accounting policies adopted for
goodwi 11 and for II As.

The findings show that, over the

study period, non-compliance with goodwill accounting
standards AAS 18 "Accounting for Goodwill" and ASRB 1013

"Accounting for Goodwi 11 11 is decreasing, but the practice
of companies recording liAs and electing not to amortise
liAs io increasing.

As a result, this supports the

argument that companies have been recognising liAs to
;,,

7

reduce the influence of the requirement of accounting
standards for goodwill amortisation on reported operating
profits,

In summary, the findings of the above studies sug;est that
the compliance with the relevant goodwill accounting
standard to amortise goodwill systematically over a period
not exceeding 20 years (ASRB, 1988, ASRB 1013, clause .35)
may cause the companies shift to non-compliance with AGRS
"Accounting for Intangible Assets Recognised in Accordance

with Statement of Accounting Standards AAS 18 •Accounting
for Goodwi 11• ".

In other words, the companies have

started to re-classify goodwill as liAs and have adopted
the practice of zero amortisation for some or all of the
liAs.

It appears that the only empirical study which is using
contracting theory is Coombes et al. (1993).

They select

a sample of top 150 Australian Stock Exchange listed
companies, ranked by market capitalisationr as at 30 June,
1988, over the period 1986 to 1989.

They examine the

IIAs' amortisation accounting policy choices and the
corporate lobbying submissions made in 1989 on ED49
"Accountin; for Identifiable Intangible Assets".
findin;~

The

support the liAs' ;rowth option hypothesis and

the effects of liAs' le;al lives hypothesis, that is, the
incentives to amortise IIAs depend upon the payoffs under
claimholder contracts in the firms in order to indicate

8

the cash flows to be derived from the IIAs.

Support of

the findings for the profit-based management compensation
incentives to amortise liAs only occurs in 1989 when the
AARP introduced ED49 "Accounting for Identifiable

Intangible Assets".

In addition, the findings reveal that

the debt covenants hypotheses for existing debt and future
debt raisings, and the political visibility costs
hypothesis receive little or no support.

From the literature reviewed, with the exception of
Coombes et. al. ( 1993), the use of contracting theory to

demonstrate some explanation for the amortisation of liAs
seem& to be extremely thin.

It is the purpose of this

research to employ contracting theory to examine the
reasons why comi'anies adopt particular liAs 1 amortisation
policy.

Contracting theory will be discussed in the

following section.

2.2

Contracting Theory

Accounting researchers have been concentrated on
developinq a positive accountinq theory to explain and
predict the economic factors that determine management's
choices of accountin9 procedures and methods.

There are

two stages in the development of positive accounting
theory.

The first is the information perspective which

investigates the relationship between the announcement of

9

accounting earnings and the reaction of share prices, and
suggests that accounting methods are chosen to reveal the
manager's expectations about the future cash flows of the
firm.

The second is the contracting perspective which

involves contracting costs in firms and in the political
process, and focuses on either the ex post research
(opportunistic behaviour) or the ex ante research
(efficient contractinq) (Houltausen, 1990; Watts, 1992;
Watts & Zimmerman, 1990).

The ex post research concentrates on the "specification of
an accounting policy choice as a part of the bonding and
monitoring process to reduce the costs of contracting",
whereas the ex ante research

concentr~tes

on the

rationalisation of an accounting policy choice for

opportunistic behaviour by managers to transfer wealth
away from other claimholders on the firm to managers in
order to maximise their own utility (Hodgson, lioi..-,-,es

&

Kam, 1992, p.388).

Jensen & Mecklinq (1976) examine the contractual

relationship between m•na9ers and shareholders and between
mana9ers-shareholders and debtholders.

To them, the firm

is defined as a "nexus of contracts", which in turn will
give rise an "a9ency relationship" between the supr.!_iers
of

va~ious

production factars, such as debt, equity and

human capital (Whittred & Zimmer, 1990, p.7).
relationship described by Jensen

&

The aqency

Mecklinq (1976, p.308)

10

is "a contract under which one or more person (the

principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform
some services on their behalf which involves delegating
some decision making authority to the agent".

However, this agency relationship causes the problem of
ayency costs.

Jensen & Meckling (1976, p.308) have

identified a list of agency costs which include monitoring

ex9enditures by the principal, bonding expenditures by the
agent and a residual loss.

These agency costs which often

arise in "contractual scenarios" have led to the use of
the term "contracting costs" instead of agency costs
(Watts & Zimmerman, 1990, p.134).

The contracts (debt covenants, management compensation
plan, contracts arise in political process, and other
contracts, such as sales contracts) between the suppliers
of production factors are often written around accounting
numbers.

Contracting theory suggests that the contracts

between the contracting parties via accounting numbers as
ex ante mechanisms to minimise the contracting costs and
hence maximise the value of the company (Watts &
Zimmerman, 1990).

However, on one hand, the accounting

numbers are used to enforce the legal and property rights
between the contracting parties; on the other hand,
manipulation in the measurement of these accounting
numbers as the result of ex post opportunistic managerial

11

behaviour can effectively redistribute the wealth between
the »arties. (Whittred

&

Zinrner, 1990, p.7)

As a result, contracting theory is often used to explain

and predict the management's incentives to choose a
particular accounting procedure and method.

The

management incentives examined in this research relate to
the growth option nature of IIAs, the effects of legal
provisions qoverniuq the utilisation of I lAs, the debt
contract incentives .and the political costs.

the hypotheses

d•~eloped

Therefore,

in this study are based on these

management incentives and will be discussed in the
following section.

2.3

Hypotheses

Since this research is a replication of the study done by

Coombes et al. (1993), all the development of hypotheses

in the present research is based on the same theoretical

framework used in the previous study, with some exceptions
made in this study.

First, the period
1

1989-.~990

was selected for the present

research, to consider if there are any changes in the

I

liAs' amortisatfr.m accounting policy cboicf' before and

I

subsequent to the issue of ED49 "Accounting for

I

l
J

,,!

:. ]

Identifiable Intangible Assets".

The previous study

12

selected the period 1986-1989 which is before the Au9ust
1989 release of the ED49 "Accountin9 for Identifiable
IntlS.n;ible Assets", in order to avoid the effect of
exposure draft.

Next, the dependent variable used in the previous study,
AMORT, concentrates only on the amortisation expenses,
whereas the present study uses AMORT to focus on all the
write-offs of riAs including

am~rtisation

expenses,

abnormal items and extraordinary items in order to capture
the whole aspect of the liAs' amortisation accounting
choices (see Section 3.2.1 later) .
•

The previous study uses the measure of total beQinning
balance of liAs to calculate the independent variables,
whereas the ,'~resent study uses the measure of liAs'

average balance by dividing the total of liAs' opening
balance and closing balence in the study year by two, in

"

order to take into consideration of the impact of disposal

',

':;

iI

l

l
1

l

or acquisition of liAs (see Section 3.2.1 later).

In addition, the present study uses market capitalisation
which was taken from Personal Investment as the measure of
the denominator of independent variable in hypothesis H1 a
(IIAMC, that is the ratio of liAs to market capitalisation
of companies) and as the measure of the independent
variable in hypothesis H4 (SIZE) (see Section 3.2.2
later). The previou3 study uses market value of equity

13

which was taken from

~he

Australian in hypothesis H1a and

their own formula to calculate market capitalisation in

hypothesis H4.

Finally, the present study does not include the hypothesis

of political sensitive industries which used by Coombes et
al. (1993).

It was not possible, with the time frame of

this study, to seek the judgements of six individual
academics to rate the industries.

2.3.1

The Growth Option Nature of liAs

Coombes et al. (1993, p.6) argue that the choice of
amortisation rate is an "efficient revelation" of the
growth option of liAs.

The companies with valuable growth

options on investments of liAs are less likely to choose a
high amortisation rate as this would pass the wrong

perception to the market about the investment value of the
liAs in generating cash flows and thus the value of the
company.

l

This argument is made with the underlying assumption that
the managerial performance is tied to the value of the
company and thus the stock price movements (Coombes et
al., 1993, p.&-7; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986, p.203).
Consequently, the objectives of the management can be
aligned with those of the company, so that the managers

l4

are more concerned with the real economic performance of
the company and the cash flow effect of the IIAs'
amortisation accounting choices.

Further, the managers are less concerned with the profitbased compensation incentives when the investments of liAs

has a valuable growth option and thus more likely to
choose the practice of lower amortisation rat& of IIAs.
This research uses the profitability measure formula (rate

of growth in operating profit) developed by Ayres (1986)
to proxy the profit-based compensation plan.

Therefore, it is suggested in this research:

H18 : The higher the ratio of identifiable intangible
assets to market capitalisation of companies, the lower
the amortisation rate of identifiable intangible assets.

H1 b: The lower the rate of growth in operating profit of
companies, the lower the amortisation rate of identifiable
intangible assets.

2.3.2

The effects of Legal Provisions Governing the
Utilisation of IIAB

Coombes et al. (1993, p.8) suggest that the different
types of legal lives of IIAs will indicate the

15

differential state of investment in the future, in which
"lec;~al

lives specify a maximum period over which the

corporation ¥ill have exclusive right to the cash flows
from investments in the assets."

For instance, patents

(16 years legal lives) have a higher amortisation rate
than trademarks (no defined legal lives).

Therefore, it

is suggested in this research:

H2 : Companies with identifiable intangible assets that
have limited legal lives are more likely to have higher
amortisation rate for identifiable intangible assets than
companies with identifiable intangible assets

th~t

have no

specified legal lives.

,,
'

2.3.3

Debt Contract Incentives

Research in this area has concentrated on the details of

covenant limitations to explain accounting chcice (Watts &
Zimmerman, 1990, p.139).

Consistent with Coombes et al.

(1993), the two common covenants used in this research are

l
l

l
!

!

leverage and interest coverage ratios, whereas leverage
ratio is the maintenance covenants of the existing debt,
interest coverage ratio is measured when further debt is
to be issued.

The usual argument is that management may

use income increasing accounting methods (in the present
study:

the practice of lower amortisation rate of IIAs)

to ease the covenant limitations under existing debt

.
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•

•
contracts and to

impro~e

interest coverage ratio for debt

.to be raised in the future.

(Coombes et al., 1993, p.9-

11; Mhittred and Zimmer, 1986).

Therefore, it is

suggested in this research:

H3a'

The higher the ratio of debentures to total

liabilities of companies, the lower the amortisation rate
of identifiable intangible assets.

•

H3b:

The lower the interest coverage ratio of companies,

the lower the amortisation rate of identifiable intangible
assets.

2.3.4

Political Costs

Previous research (Coombes et al., 1993, p.ll; Watts &

Zimmerman, 1986) has argued that the reported profits of
the companies that are more politically vulnerable, are

more likely to be examined by the government agencies,
trade unions and community groups who may have incentives
j

to effect wealth distributions.

Pirm size, which is a

~

traditional political cost proxy (Matts & Zimmerman, 1990,

'•

p.139), is used as surrogate for political vulnerability.

l

To reduce the political attention, larger companies tend

"

to choose income decreasing accounting methods (in this

I

~

study: the practice of higher amortisation rate of liAs).
Therefore, it is suggested in this research:

17

H4 : The larger the size of a company, the higher the
amortisation rate of identifiable intangible assets.

Ho~ever,

size is a noisy proxy for political cost because

size may surrogate for other effects such as industry
membership, competitive advantage, information production

costs, and management ability and advice (B&ll & Foster,
1982).

Hence, the results of the size hypothesis must be

carefully interpreted.

18
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1

Sample Selection

The initial sample of companies was selected from the 150
largest listed Australian companies, ranked by market
capitalisation published in June 1989 edition of Personal

Investment.

The reasons for this sample selection are,

(1) to ensure that all the accounting practices identified
were adopted in periods considerably some time after the
October 1987 stock or equity market crash; (2) any changes

j

in the requirement to the IIAs' amortisation accounting

,, I

policy choice as a result of voluntary compliance before

fIi\!

or after the introduction of ED49 "Accounting for
Identifiable Intangible Assets", which occurred in August
1989, should be readily apparent; and (3) consistent with
Coombes et al. (1993, p.12), the sample of 150 largest
listed Australian companies was considered to be
appropriate on the premise that they are the larger
companies rather than smaller companies, and thus more
likely to have engaged in takeover activity in the past
and to have recorded IIAs as part of any business
acquisition cost.
Once the initial sample of companies was identified, the
companies' consolidated annual reports, which were

.ii

�l

I

I
., II

:, t

�!'' Ii
i

19

available in either Australian Graduate School of
Management (AGSM) annual report microfiche file or

.. , '

··~<·.

Australian stock Exchange annual report microfiche fil.e

for the years 1989 or 1990, were examined.

Table 1
Sample Selection
1989

1990

150

150

Initial sample of Top 150 companies based on
market capitalisation in 1989

Less: Companies without IIAs ;,n Balance Sheets (101) (100)
Company for which it was unable to
determine the amount

~mortised

(1)

(1)

(2)

(2)

(1)

(1)

0

(2)

0

(5)

45

39

Companies that were reporting other than
$A in annual reports
Subsidiary company of another company
in the same initial sample
Companies for which it was unable to
determine the market capitalisation
Companies that were delisted
Companies satisfied selection criteria

I

II

l
l!
I

I

i

b

shown in Table 1, 101 companies in 1989 and 100

companies in 1990 were eliminated due to these companies
having no IIAs recorded in the consolidated annual

reports.

For both financial years, several companies were
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excluded:

1 company for which it was not possible to

determdne the liAs' amortisation amount, 2 companies were

not using Australian currency in their consolidated annual
reports and 1 company was the 65' subsidiary company of
another company included in the same

sam~le.

This

resulting in a sample of 45 companies that satisfied the
selection criteria in the year 1989.

For the year 1990, further elimination was done on:

2

companies because it was impossible to determine the
market capitalisation for these companies and 5 companies
were delisted from Australian stock Exchange, leaving 39
companies being included in the sample.

The resulted sample companies are listed in Appendix A for
the year 1989 and Appendix B for the year 1990.

l'
~

J
l

I
I
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3.2

Variable Measurement and Data Collection Methods

3.2 -~

Dependent Variable

This research study is focusing on management's choice of
liAs' amortisation accounting policy.

Therefore, the

dependent variable used in this study is the amortisation
rate (AKORT), which will be correlated with the
independent variable across the whole sample.

AMORT is

calculated as follows:

AKORT

=

amortisation of IIAt
I I At

where,

amortisation of IIAt

= (total

liAs' amortisation expenses

+ total abnormal ItA•s write-off
items + total extraordinary liAs'

write-off items) for the year t.

The justification for usin9 this total measure of IIAs'
amortisation is to consider the entire liAs' amortisation

accountin9 policy by management, not only the normal

amortisation .expenses of liAs.

= avera9e baJ.ance of identifiable
intan9ible assets at the end of
year t which is calculated by:
·,

,.

(Total IIAt +Total IIAt_ 1 )/2
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where,

Total IIAt

= total liAs at the
end of year t

Total IIAt-l = total liAs at the
end of year t-1.

The justification for using this average measure of IIAt
is to consider the impact of the disposal or acquisition
of liAs.

This measure tends to smooth out the extreme

balance of total liAs when there is recognition of

disposal or acquisition of liAs half way through the year
t or the study year.

Independent Variables

3.2.2

Hypothesis H18 states that the higher the ratio of liAs to
market capitalisation of companies (IIAHC), the lower the

amortisation rate of liAs (AMORT).

IIAMC is calculated as

follows:

IIAMC

=

!!At
MCt

where,
!!At

= as

MCt

=

previ~usly

defined in section 3.2.1

market capitalisation at the end of year t which
was taken from June 1989 (p.76) and June 1990
(p.90) editions of Personal Investment.
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Hypothesis Hlb states that the lower the rate of growth in

operating profit of companies (OPGROW), the lower the
amortisation rate of IIAs (AMORT).

OPGRON is calculated

as follows:
PretaxOPt + AMORTt - PretaxOPt-l

OPGROII =

Pretax0Pt_ 1

where,
PretaxOPt

= operating profit before tax for the year t

AMORTt

= the amortisation rate of liAs for the year
t and this effect is realised by adding

back to PretaxOPt

= operating profit before tax for the year

Pretax0Pt_ 1

t-1.

Hypothesis H2 states that companies with liAs that have

limited legal lives (LIFE) are more likely to have higher
amortisation rate of IIAs (AMORT) than companies with IIAs
that have unlimited legal lives.

Consistent with Coombes

et al. (1993, p.lS), the IIAs of each company were divided
into two groups as either having a limited life or having-

an unlimited life.
limited

le<;~al

copyri<;~hts,

Those assets

life are:

<;~rouped

as havin9 a

patents, property rights,

management rights, film and television

production rights, television program ri;htzs, licences and
franchise agreements; and those not havin9 legal lives

are: business and brand names, trademarks, broadcasting
licences (Australian companies always extend the

le<;~al
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lives of broadcasting licences which are renewable every
three years under the provisions of the Broadcasting Act
1942), fermentation technology and mastheads.

One of the

problems in using this grouping method is that many
companies group together the liAs of different classes
which have d;,fferent legal lives, for example, patents,

trademarks and.licences, and only disclose the total
balance of the assets in the published consolidated annual
reports.

This problem is dealt with using the same coding

as Coombes et al. (1993, p.lS), by assigning the value "1"

to the company's group of liAs, if any of the company's
liAs had a limited life and by assigning the value "0" if

all of the company's liAs have unlimited lives.

However,

there may be a bias expectation involved in the finding of
the H2 prediction, when using this grouping method, the
companies which have liAs with unlimited lives (expected
to have a lower amortisation rate of liAs) are treated the
same as those liAs with unlimited lives (expected to have
a higher amortisation rate of liAs).

-~

;

'
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Hypothesis H3a states that the higher ratio of debentures
to total liabilities of companies (DEB), the lower the
amortisation rate of liAs (AMORT).

DEB is calculated as

follows:

debenturet
DEB

=

TLt

where,
debenturet

= total debentures at the end of year t

TLt

= total liabilities at the end of year t.

Hypothesis H3b states that the lower the interest coverage
ratio of companies ( INTCOV), the lower the amortisation

rate of IIAs (AMORT).

INTCOV =

INTCOV is calculated as follows:

PretaxOPt + AMORTt + Interestt
Interestt

where,
PretaxOPt

=

operating profit before tax for the year t

AMORTt

=

the amortisation rate of liAs as previously
defined

Interestt

=

total interest expenses (which excludes
interest capitalisation) for the year t.
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Hypothesis H4 states that the larger the size of a company
(SIZE), the higher the amortisation rate of IIAs (AMORT).
As mentioned in Section 2.3.4, firm size has commonly been
used as a proxy for political costs (Watts & Zimmerman,
1990, p.l39).

There are a variety of measurements of. size

such as total assets (Hagerman & Zmijewski, 1979), sales
revenue (El-Gazzer, Lilien & Pastena, 1986), market
capitalisation, and net income after tax and before
extraordinary items (Wong, 1988).

Initially, market

capitalisation is used as the measure of size, the
measures of total assets and sales revenue will be
discussed for the sensitivity of the choice of the size
measurement in Section 4.5.1.

SIZE is measured as

follows:

SIZE

=

where,
MCt

= market capitalisation as previously defined.

A summary of the calculation of each variable is presented
in Appendix

c.

Section 4 will discuss tho results of the

regression analyses of these dependent and independent
variables.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS

4.1

Descriptive Statistics

The classes of IIAs disclosed in the consolidated annual
reports which were examined are summarised in Table 2.
The classes and disclosure frequency of IIAs are
comparable with that reported by Coombes et al. (1993,
p.17) and previous studies (see Carnegie & Kallio, 1988,
p.82; Goodwin & Harris, 1991, p.25; Wines & Ferguson,
1993, p.98).

Table 2 reveals that rights (of any type)

are the IIAs that are most common and have the greatest
disclosure frequency in the sample companies, whereas
patents, trademarks and licences are the IIAs that have
second greatest disclosure frequency.
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Table 2
Classes of liAs Involved

Class
Rights (of any type)

1989

19%

Total

14

12
7

26
5

5

0

Patents/Trademarks/Licences
Brandnames

8
5

Radio and TV Licences
Patents/Trademarks

4

3

7

3

3
3

Patents

3
2

Tradenames

2

2

Trademarks

2

2

Licences (of any type)

1

1

Trademarks/Tradenames/Brandnames

1

1

6
6
5
4
4
2
2

Technological Assets

l

1

2

Brandnames/Patents/Trademarks

1

1

2

Trade/Business names

1

1

2

Trademarks/Licences

1

1

Patents/Licences/Technologies

1

1

2
2

Brandnames/Trademarks/Licences

1

0

1

Patents/Newspaper Mastheads

1

0

1

Business names/Trademarks

1

1

Newspaper Mastheads

1

0
0

Trademarks/Brandnames
Tradenames/Management Rights

1
1

0

1

0

1

Trade & Brandnames

1

1

Brandnames/Trademarks/Other
Patents/Licences
Franchises

1

0
0

0

1

0

1

1
1

58

49

107

Management Agreements

TOTAL 1

3

1

1

•several companies had recognised more than one class of
IIAa.
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:lll:!l!!

~
1

12C2!Y!tinsa f:ol icies of llmml!l! ComJ!aniea
•

1989
Policy

1990

n

'

n

'

1.

amortisation

15

33.3

16

41.0

2.

no amortisation

19

42.2

17

43.6

3.

1

5

11.1

3

7.7

4.

write-off ex.trao,;dinary

2

4.5

1

2.6

5.

write-off abnormal

2

4.5

2

5.1

6.

1

&

3

1

2.2

0

0.0

7.

2

&

3

1

2.2

0

0.0

&

2

45 100.0

TOTAL

39 100.0

The accounting policies used by the sample companies in
each of the financial years 1989 and 1990 are summarised

in Table 3.

This table follows a similar pattern to

Coombes et al. (1993, p.18) and Wines & Ferguson (1993,
p.100), except for the first category - amortisation,
which is combinin9 systematic amortisation &;;,d nonsystematic amortisation, due to the reason that most of
the sample companies' consolidated annual reports only

reported the total balance of amortisation without
disclosing the amortisation period of estimated useful
life for each individual IIA.
Table 3 are:

The accounting policies in

l

l

!

Ii
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1.

Identifiable Intangibles assets (IIAs) capitalised
and amortised {amortisation).

2.

IIAs capitalised and not amortised (no amortisation).

3.

liAs capitalised with a mixture of amortisation and
non-amortisation for different classes of liAs
(1 & 2).

4.

liAs written off in a lump sums as an extraordinary

item (write-off extraordinary).
5.

liAs written off in a lump sum as an abnormal item

(write-off abnormal item).
6.

liAs capitalised and amortised and also a lump sum

extraordinary write-off is made (1 & 3).
7.

liAs capitalised and not amortised and also a lump

sum extraordinary write-off is made (2 & 3).

Whereas in the year 1989, 19 (42.2\) of the 45 sample
companies chose not to amortise any of their liAs, 5

companies (11.1\) applied a dual policy in which some but
not all of tbe liAs were amortised; in the year 1990, of

the 39 sample companies, 17 (43.6\) chose the zero
amortisation policy and 3 companies (7.7\) chose the dual
policy.

However, AARP would not accept no amortisation of

IIAs because they view these assets as having finite lives
(Coombes et al., 1993, p.3), and ED49 "Accounting for
Identifiable Intangible Assets" was aiming to deter this
practice of zero amortisation.

The reasons ;iven by the

sample companies in the consolidated annual reports for
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not amortising some or all of their liAs are summarised in
Table 4.

Table 4
Reaaons Given for Accounting PolicY on liAs

1989

1990

'

n

n

'

Reasons for not amortising
Infinite U~eful Economic Life

and Regularly Revalued
Regularly Revalued
Limited Useful Life but likely

5

19.2

3

3

11.5

3

13.6
13.6

to be Renewed
No Diminution in Value and
Regularly Revalued

3

11.5

3

13.6

2

2

9.1

Infinite Useful Economic Life

1

7.7
3.9

1

4.6

1

3.9

1

4.6

1

3.9
38.4

0

o.o

9

40.9

22b

100.0

Indeterminable Useful Economdc

Life

ar~d

Regularly Revalued

No amortisation until Limitati~n
or Loss of useful economic life

No Reason/No policy

10

TOTAL

36a 100.0

fDr amortising
Finite Useful Economic Life
Amount write-off to recognise
permenent diminution
Ho Reason/No Policy

Reasons

TO'rAL

a, companiea

15

60.0

13

61.9

2

8.0
32.0

3

14.3
23.8

8

25a 100.0

5

2lb 100.0

in 1989 and b4 in 1990 with dual policies
atated diffarent reasons for different classes of liAs.
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Consistent with Coombes et al. (1993, p.19), the most
common reasons for not amortising liAs were that the asset
involved is either characterised to have an infinite
useful economic life and subjected to regularly

revaluation, or having a limited useful l.ife but the life
is likely to be extended or renewed.

On the other hand,

the reasons given for amortising the liAs were that the
asset is

~ither

having a finite useful economic life (the

most common reason), or recognising permanent diminution
in value.

From the results in Table 4, prima facie, the

hypotheses H1a and a 2 are supported.
The Systat (Version 5.1) statistical software package
(Wilkinson, 1989) was used in this research to analyse and
present the outcome of descriptive statistics, simple
regression (univariate analysis) and multiple regression
(multivariate analysis).
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4.2

Econometric Problems

Regression analyses for both the two-variable linear
(simple) regression and multiple regression are used to
test the hypotheses stated in Section 2.3.

Whenever more

than one independent variable appears in a regressiQn
model, there are other issues which arise about the
relationships between some or all of the variables.

There

are two fundamental assumptions that are critically
important and relevant to the validity

~f

the regression

results in this study (Bails & Peppers, 1993, p.240, 254256; Draper & Smith, 1981):

(1)

No multicollinearity:

the independent variables must

be independent of each other.

In other words, the problem

of multicollinearity occurs when the independent variables
contribute somewhat overlapping information for describing
the dependent variable.

(2)

No heteroscedasticity:

the assumption of the

homoscedasticity that the variance of the error term is
constant for all values of independent variables.

That is

heteroscedasticity occurs when the nonconstant error
variance occurs.

Econometric problems occur when these two assumptions are
violated.

In other words, when the problems of

heteroscedasticity r.nd multicollinearity occur, the
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validity of the regression results will be questionable.
These econometric problems occurred in this study and have
been dealt with by transformation of the var.!.ables (Draper

& Smith, 1981) using statistical software package Systat
Version 5.1 (Wilkinson, 1989).

All the observations of

dependent variable AMORT were increased by 0.0001 before
receiving the natural log transformation due to a number
of zero value observations.

The independent variable

IIAMC received the same transformation treatment. The
independent variable DEB was redefined using a fourth root
transformation.

All the negative observations of the

independent variable INTCOV were winsorized to the next
extreme small positive value of 0.100 in 1989 and 0.555 in
1990 before receiving the natural log transformation.

The

most extreme neqative observations of the independent
variable OPGROW were winsorized to the next most extreme
negative value: -72.007 to -3.002 in 1989 and -78.688 to
-5.661 in 1990, then, all the observations received the
exponential function transformation.

All the observations

of the independent variable SIZE received the natural log
transformation.

No transformation was made to the

independent variable LIFE.

The statistical procedures that are available in Systat
version 5.1 to test for the existence of multicollinearity
and heteroscedasticity will be discussed and shown in
section 4. 4.
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Table 5 presents descriptive statistics of the raw data
for dependent and independent variables in both 1989 and
1990 across the sample companies.

Table 5
Descri2tive Statistics (Raw Datal

Variables

Median

Mean

std.Dev.

Minimum

Maximum

= 45)

(1989 n
AMORT

0. 090

0.002

0.2l9

0.000

1.000

DEB

0.004

0. 000

0.013

0.000

0.078

INTCOV

9. 047

4. 051

24.851

-0.594

168.654

OPGROW

-1.459

0 .198

10.784

-72.007

1.628

IIAMC

0.406

0. 037

1.046

0.000

5.331

SIZE

0 .16E10

0. 72E10

0.21E10

0 .12E9

0 .10Ell

LIFE

= 32
(0) = 13

Number of Limited Life Companies (1)
Number

of Unlimited Life Companies
(1990

n

= 39)

AMORT

0.085

0.005

0.222

0.000

l.OOO

DEB

0 .OQl

0.000

0.005

o.ooo

0.026

INTCOV

68.116

4. 643

317.924

-1.378

1958.083

OPGROW

-1.845

0.025

12.747

-78.688

8.046

IIAMC

0. 487

0.046

1.908

o.ooo

11.676

SIZE

0 .18!10

0. 25!10

0.99!9

0. 82E8

LIFE

0 .13Ell

= 29
(0) = 10

Number of Limited Life Companies (1)
Number of Unlimited Life Companies

'
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Tablti 6 presents descriptive statistics for the
transformed data.

The transformation of data is discussed

in Section 4 o2 o

Table 6

Descriptive Statistics {Transformed Data)
Variables

Mean

Median

StdoDevo Skewness

Kurtosis

= 45)

(1989 n
lnl\MORT

-5o891

-6 o136

3 0382

Oo 271

-1.578

DEBOo25

0 o068

0 oOOO

0 o140

1o859

2o182

lniNTCOV

1.287

1.389

1o 298

-Oo452

2o442

eOPGROW

1.412

1.219

0 0985

2o124

5o487

lniil\MC

-3o371

-3 0294

2 0714

-Oo443

Oo001

lnSIZE

20 0500

20 0395

1o159

Oo444

-0o946

LIFE

Number of Limited Life Companies (1) = 32

Number of Unlimited Life Companies (0) = 13
(1990

n

= 39)

lnl\MORT

-5o7ll

-s 0201

3 0332

0 0095

-10 611

DEBO o25

Oo040

0 0000

0 o104

2o381

4o194

lniNTCOV

1.689

1o535

1.581

1.804

4o434

eOPGROW

1.420

1.025

1ol42

1. 409

1.069

lniiliMC

-3o397

-3o077

2 0429

-Oo173

0 0538

lnSIZE

20o642

20 0716

1.217

Oo119

-Oo664

LIP!

Number of Limited Life Companies (1) = 29

-~

:l

'
i~

:~
j

j
J

j

l
i

~'

Humber of Unlimited Life Companies (0)

= 10

37
J
'

4.3

--~

Univariate Analysis

Table 7 presents, using Pearson product moment
correlation, the correlation coefficients between the

dependent variable (AMORT) and the set of independent
variables.

Table 7
Pearson Correlations with InAMORT

Correlation Coefficient
(' p' • one-tailed)

DEB0.25

lniNTCOV

eOPGROll

lniiAMC

lnSIZE

LIFE

1989 (n = 45)
0.249

0.108

0.138

-0.301

0.046

0.397

(0.050)

(0.240)

(0.183)

(0.022)

(0.382)

(0.004)

1990 (n = 39)
0.152

0.019

0.022

-0.316

0.043

0.388

(0.178)

(0.455)

(0.447)

(0.025)

(0.397)

(0.008)

Consistent with Coombes eta!. (1993, p.21) across the two
i

financial years 1989 and 1990, both the IIAMC (p<.05) and

'

LIFE (p<.01) are si9nificantly correlated with AMORT, and

;

j

]
'

-~

the negative correlation for IIAMC and positive

correlation for LIFE support hypotheses H1a and H2.
Althou9h the independent variable DEB0.25 in 1989 (p=.050)
is si9nificantly correlated with AMORT, the positive
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correlation does not support hypothesis H3a·

In 1990,

DEB0.25 is no longer significant in the opposite predicted
direction.

The results on the remaining variables are not

significant at conventional levels (at least .100) and
thus do not support H1b• H38 , H3b and H4.

Also, the

results from Table 7 indicate that there is no difference
in the Ill\.s' amortisation pol icy choice before or after
the releaoe of ED49 "Accounting for Identifiable
Intangible Assets".

Soliman (1989, p.66) suggests that no independent variable
per se is likely to explain the dependent variable when

the preliminary examination of the
coefficients shows low correlation.

sim~le

correlation

It appears in this

study that the highest correlation is consistently between
the independent variable LIFE and the dependent variable
AMORT, 0.397 in 1989 (R2 = 0.158) and 0.388 in 1990
(R2 = 0.151).

Therefore, it is expected that a

combination of the set of independent variables when
examined using multivariate analysis will provide better
and a more powerful explanation of the accounting choices

made by management.
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4.4

Multivariate Analysis

The multivariate model used by this research is:
·•

lnAHORT

= aO - B1 lnllAMCi + B2eOPGROWi + B3LlFEi B4DEBi0.2S + BslnlNTCOVi + B6 lnSlZEi + ei

where, i = company 1 to company 45 in the year 1989 and

company 1 to company 39 in the year 1990.

Table 8 below presents the ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression results on all the variables across 1989 and

1990.

In 1989, the estimated R2 is 0.345 and the F ratio 3.332
is significant at the p=.010 level.

The llAMC and LIFE

variables are significant with the.expected sign at the

p<.026 level (two-tailed).

The OPGROW variable

i~

significant (p<.083, one tailed) with the expected sign
and the remaining variables are insignificant at

conventional levels (at least .100).

In 1990, the

estimated R2 is 0.278 and the F ratio 2.051 is significant
at the p=.087 level.

Consistent with the results in 1989,

both the IIAHC and LIFE variables are significant at the
p<.028 level (two-tailed) with the expected sign.

The

remaining variables including OPGROW are insignificant at
the conventional levels.

It appears from the results in

Table 8 that the hypothesis H1b is the only hypothesis
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Table 8
OL§

B!~U:esston

Results
Dependent Variable: lnAMORT

variables

Pred.Sign

Coefficient

t-stat

'p' (two-tailed)

1989 (n = 45)
Constant

+/-

lniiAMC

-3.752

-0.461

0.647

-o. 416

-2.323

0.026

eOPGROW

+

0.729

1.414

0.165

LIFE

+

3.251

3.113

0.004

4.419

1.265

0.214

DEB0.25
lniNTCOV

+

-0.003

-0.006

0.995

lnSIZE

+

-0.350

-0.867

0.392

!'-Ratio

(p=.010)

3.332

estimated R2

0.345
1990 (n = 39)

Constant

+/-

lniiAMC

-5.722

-o. 659

0.514

-0.509

-2.307

0.028

eOPGROW

+

0.639

0.997

0.326

[, II.'E

+

2.875

2.459

0.020

2.932

0.573

0.571

Dl!B0.25
lniiiTCOV

+

-0.317

-0.697

0.491

lnSIZE

+

-0.211

-o. 493

0.625

!'-Ratio

2.051

estimated R2

(p=.087)
0.278
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that has inconsistent results between 1989-1990 which is
supported in 1989, p=.083 (one-tailed) with expected sign
and not in 1990.

This is possibly because of the issue of

the ED49 "Accounting for Identifiable Intangible Assets"
<_

which occurred in August 1989.

The remaining results are consistent with the univariate

results which support hypotheses H1 a and H2 and do not
support hypotheses H3 a, H3 b and H4 . These results are
also comparable with those in Coombes et al. (1993, p.22).

Table 9 presents the Pearson correlation matrix for the

year 1989 between independent variables and extended
results about the information of multicollinearity

problem.

According to Belsley, Kuh & Welsh (cited in

Wilkinson, 1989, p.l63), "a condition index greater than
{

'
I

•\

!

15 indicates a possible problem and one greater than 30
suggests a serious problem with collinearity."

As shown

in the table 9, no condition index is greater than 15

I
I

l
I

ll

!

except index 7 which is between constant and SIZE as

indicated in variance proportions.

Since the constant is

only an intercept, it is not a problem in this case.

Therefore, there is no problem with multicollinearity
among the independent variables.

A plot of residuals

against predicted values is shown in Figure 1 which
indicates little change in the residuals as the estimates
(predicted values) increase, as the problem with
heteroscedaaticity occurs when the non-constant variance
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appears to be a large increasing or decreasing function of

the estimates (Draper & Smith, 1981, p.237).

Therefore,

there is no problem with heteroscedasticity in the
regression.

Table 9
Pearson Correlation Matrix (1989 n

LIFE
LIFE
DEB0.25

DEB0.25 lniNTCOV

= 45l
eOPGRON

lniiAMC lnSIZE

1.000
-0.259

1.000

lniNTCOV -0.017

0.091

1.000

eOPGRON

0.099

0.192

-0.354

1.000

ln!IAMC

-o .136

0.100

0. 261

0.076

1.000

lnSIZE

-0.135

-0.130

-0.016

0.035

0.220

1.000

Extended Results:
Condition Indices

1

2

3

4

5

1.000

2.287

3.502

4.009

4.635

6

7

6.291 58.885

Variance Proportion
l

2

3

4

5

6

7

Constant

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.006

0.994

LIFE

0.007

0.017

0.166

0.014

o. 235

0.553

0.008

DEB0.25

0.007

0.483

0.285

0.072

0.138

0.000

0.015

lniiiTCOV

0.010

0.052

0.224

0.428

0.257

0.030

o.ooo

eOPGRON

0.007

0.025

0.001

0.024

0.566

0.371

0.005

ln!UHC

0.010

0.004

0.149

0.626

0.047

0.127

0.037

lnSIZE

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

o.ooo

0.005

0.994
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Figure 1 - A Plot of Residuals Against Estimates

(Predicted Values) for 1989 (n = 45)

Table 10 and fi9ure 2 present the results for the year
1990 which are similar to those of Table 9 and Fi9ure 1.

Table 10
f:earson Correlatign Matrix {1990 n = 39}

LIFE
LIFE
DEB0.25

DEB0.25 lniHTCOV

eOPGROW

lniiAMC lnSIZE

1.000
-0.225

1.000

lniHTCOV -0.090

0.036

1.000

eOPGROW

0.053

0.139

-0.702

1.000

lniiAMC

-0.025

-0.041

0.248

-0.290

1.000

lnSIZE

-0.051

-0.110

0.119

-0.126

0.286

1.000

Extended Results:
Condition Indices
1

2

3

4

5

6

1.000

2. 243

3. 214

4. 201

5.410

3

4

5

6

7

7

7.171 55.738

Variance Proportion

1

2

!

Constant

0.000

o.ooo o.ooo

0.000

0.003

0.004

0.994

'
'''
1

LIFE

0.008

0.006

0.009

0.325

0.508

0.145

0.000

l

DI!B0.25

0.005

0.576

0.284

0.110

0.011

0.004

0.010

lniHTCOV

0.006

0.026

0.096

0.087

0.282

0.489

0.013

i

eOPGROW

0.005

0.021

0.076

0.001

0.134

0.752

0.008

I

lniiAMC

0.008

0.001

0.193

0.423

0.036

0.303

0.039

lnSIZI!

0.000

0.000

o.ooo o.ooo

0.003

0.003

0.993

\
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4.5

Specification Analysis

4.5.1

Alternative IIAHC and SIZE measures

In order to test the sensitivity of results

r~ported

in

table 8, the measurements of the independent variable SIZE
was calculated using sales revenue and total assets and
the IJAMC variable was redefined using the following

formulas:

(1)

IIAREV =

II At
REVt

where,

= liAs' average balance as previously defined in

IlAt

section 3.2.1

= sales revenue at the end of year t.

RBVt

(2)

IIATA

=

II At
TAt

where,
IlAt

=

liAs' average balance as previously defined in

section 3.2.1
TAt

= total assets at the end of year t.

The results pattern of these tests are consistent with
those in Table 8 and Coombes et al. (1993, p.25).

In
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1989, p values (two-tailed) are .029 for IIAREV, .042 for
IIATA, • 249 for REV, • 355 for TA; and in 1990, p values
(two tailed) are .033 for IIAREV, .054 for !lATA,

REV and .394 for TA.

• 751 for

These results are presented in

Appendix D and Appendix E, as well as Appendix C presents
a summary of variables' formulas.

Pooled Data Analysis

4.5. 2

Table 11 presents a pooled data analysis which is

combining data over 2 years 1989-1990.

One of the

underlying assumptions to use pooled data analysis is that

Table 11

OLS Tiegression Results (Pooled n

= 841

Dependent Variable lnAMORT
Variables

Pred.Siqn

Constant

Coefficient

+/-

lniiAMC

~

I
•j
l

'p' (two-tailed)

-5.006

-0.887

0. 378

-0.466

-3.588

0.001

eOPGROW

+

0.611

1.639

0.105

LIFE

+

3.063

4.118

0.000

3.593

1.310

0.194

DEB0.25

I
~l

t-Stat

lniNTCOV

+

-0.162

-0.594

0.554

lnSIZE

+

-o. 264

-0.945

0.348

F-Ratio

(p<.OOO)

5.659

estimated a2

o. 306
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the accounting policy choices are assessed independently
from one year to the next (Coombes et al., 1993, p.25).

Table 11 indicates that both the IIAMC and LIFE variables
are significant at p=.OOl, p=.OOO levels respectively with

the expected sign.

Whereas the OPGROW variable is

significant at p=.OS3 (one-tailed) with the expected sign,

the INTCOV variable is significant at p=.097 (one-tailed)
with the negative sign.

The remaining variables are

insignificant at the conventional levels.

Consequently,

the results from Table 11 are consistent with the results

of univariate and multivariate analyses for each
individual year discussed in sections 4.3 and 4.4, with

the exception of hypothesis H1 b (OPGROW) which is
supported at p=.053 (one-tailed) level, the results
support hypotheses Hla and H2 and do not support H3 8

,

H3b

and H4 .
The estimated R2 0,306 and F ratio 5.659 (p=.OOO) of the
pooled model are higher then those in Table 8, probably
because of the sample size is larger in pooled data
analysis and hence providinq better explanation of
accountinq choices.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS

5.1

Conclusions and Sununary

This research replicates with modifications the previous
study done by Coombes et al. (1993).

This research

investigates whether the management's choice of IIAs'
amortisation method is related to growth option nature of
IIAs and the effects of IIAs' legal lives of the company

(hypotheses Hia and H2), profit-based managerial

compensation incentives (H1b), company's indebtedness of

existing debt contracts (H3a), company's ability to raise
future debt in debt markets (H3b) or political
vulnerability costs (H4).

The findings for both the

univariate and multivariate regression analyses in this

research support hypotheses H1a and H2 in the study by

Coombes et al. (1993), which indicate that management's
choice of amortisation on IIAs depends on whether the
investment of these assets has a valuable growth option in
order to generate cash flows into the company.

The

findings do not support hypotheses H3a, H3b and H4, which
reveal that the practice of IIAs' amortisation is not

related to the reasons of reducing covenant limitations
under debt contracts (H3a> and future debt raisings (H3b),
and causing minimisation of political vulnerability (H4).

This research also attempts to examine whether any changes
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in the liAs' amortisation policy choice occurred before or
after the issue of ED49 "Accounting for Identifiable
Intangible Assets".

It appears from the results that _the

only hypothesis that is affected by the introduction of
exposure draft is the profit-based managerial compensation
incentives (Hlb) to amortise liAs.

Support for H1b only

occurred in 1989, possibly due to ED49 "Accounting for
Identifiable Intangible Assets" issued by the AARF which
required systematic amortisation of liAs.

These findings

are consistent with those of Coombes et al. (1993).

5.2

The Limdtations of the Research

The limitations of the present study are, first, the
rletail disclosure of amortisation policy and
classification of each individual identifiable intangible
asset was inadequate, some companies even reported only
the total balance of intangibles' amortisation which
included both the goodwill and IlAs.

Consequently,

subjective judgement may inevitably be involved in the
present study to calculate the amortisation amount of
liAs.

One company is excluded in the sample due to the

fact that it was unable to determine the company's liAs'
amortisation amount.

This limitation also suggesls that

there is a violation in the goodwill approved standard
ASRB 1013 "Accounting for Goodwill" in the study period
1989-1990 which requires the goodwill amortisation amount
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to be disclosed individually and separately (ASRB, 1988,
ASRB 1013, clause .70).

Surprisingly, some of the

consolidated annual reports, which ignored the ASRB 1013
amortisation disclosure requirements, did not have a
qualified audit report attached.

Secondly, the study only concentrates on the top 150
listed Australian companies in June 1989, the results may
not be generaliseable to smaller companies.

Further, due

to the sample consisting only of the top 150 listed
companies, the study cannot include industry
classification analysis as an explanatory variable that
the resulted sample may be biased towards certain
industries.

Consequently, some industries have only one

or not even any industry membership in the resulted
sample.

Therefore, further research would require a

larger sample in order to better equip the study's
inferential ability and to include the industry
classification analysis in the study.

Finally, previous research in contracting theory (Watts &
Zimmerman, 1990, p.l44; Zmijewski

&

Hagerman, 1981) argues

that companies may use a portfolio approach and not
concentrate on a single accounting policy.

Nevertheless,

the controversial nature of liAs' accounting policy
(Coombes et al., 1993, p.S) justifies the research into a
single accounting policy.

However, caution must be
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exercised in interpreting the results of the research into
a single accounting policy.

5.3

The Implications of the Research

One implication of this research is that the results
provided by the research suggests that contracting theory
explains in part management's choice of accounting policy
for amortisation of liAs.

The findings provided by the present research are
consistent with the study by Coombes et al. (1993) which
suggests that the companies choose alternative liAs'
amortisation accounting choice to reveal the generation of
cash flows from the investments in these assets.

The

findings further support the development of the framework
of a contracting theory of liAs' amortisation accounting
choice.

The findings may have some implications for the
policymakers should they revise the exposure draft on
accounting for liAs in the future.

The evidence suggests

that the implementation of the IIAs approved standard with
statutory backing to enforce compliance may force the
companies that have considered liAs• amortisation policy
as an important approach to reveal cash flows information
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to shift to alternative approach (Coombes et al., 1993,
p.31).

Finally, further research in this area may be extended to
overseas countries including developing and developed
countries.

Only then can we ascertain whether contracting

theory in relation to liAs' amortisation accounting choice
is transferable to other environments.

Further, a larger

sample would permit the inclusion of industry
classification as an explanatory variable.

Additional

insight may be provided by the inclusion of other
variables such as audit firm size.
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APPENDIX A
Sample Companies - 1989

Adelaide Brighton Cement Hold!.ngs Ltd
...delaide Steamship Co Ltd, The
Amcor Ltd
Arnotts Ltd
Australian Gas Light Co Ltd, The
Bell Group Ltd
BHP Gold Mines Ltd
Bond Corporation Holdings Ltd

Bond Media Ltd
Bora! Ltd
Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd, The

BTR Nylex Ltd
Bunnings Ltd

Burns, Philp & Co Ltd
Coles Myer Ltd
CRA Ltd
CSR Ltd
Elders IXL Ltd
Email Ltd
Goodman Fielder Hattie Ltd
Hardie (James) Industries Ltd
ICI Australia Ltd
Industrial Equity Ltd
Interwest Ltd
Jennings Industries Ltd

62

Kern Corporation Ltd
Lend Lease Corporation Ltd

Hayne Nickless Ltd
H.I.M. Holdings Ltd
National Consolidated Ltd
News Corporation Ltd

North Broken Hill Peko Ltd
Northern Star Holdings Ltd
OPSM

Industrie~

Ltd

Pacific Dunlop Ltd
Palme" Tube Mills Ltd
Pancontinental Mining Ltd
Placer Pacific Ltd
QBE Insurance GrouP Ltd

Queensland Cement Ltd
Rothmans Holdings Ltd
S.A, Brewing Holdings Ltd
Sarich Technologies Trust
southern Farmer Group Ltd

westmex Ltd
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APPEIIDIX B
Sample Companies - 1990

Adelaide Brighton Cement Holdings Ltd
Arnotts Ltd
BHP Gold Mines Ltd
Bond Media Ltd
Bora! Ltd
Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd, The

BTR Nylex Ltd
Bundaberg Sugar Co Ltd
Bunnings Ltd

Burns, Philp & Co Ltd
Coles Myer Ltd
CRA Ltd
CSR Ltd
Elders IXL Ltd
Email Ltd
Goodman Fielder Wattie Ltd

Hardie (James) Industries Ltd
ICI Australia Ltd
Jennin9s Group Ltd
Kern Corporation Ltd

Lend Lease Corporation Ltd
Mayne Nickless Ltd
Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd
M.I.M. Holdings Ltd
National Consolidated Ltd
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News Co<po<ation Ltd
North Broken Hill Peko Ltd
OPSM Industries Ltd
Palmer Tube Mills Ltd

Pancontinental Mining Ltd
Pioneer International Ltd
Placer Pacific Ltd

QBE Insurance Group Ltd
Queensland Cement Ltd
Rothmans Holdings Ltd
S.A. Brewing Holdings Ltd

Sarich Technologies Trust
Soul Pattinson (Washington H.) & Co Ltd
Tooth & Co Ltd

---

---~----
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APPENDIX C

Variables Definition

AMORT

= total amortisation write-offs of liAs/average
bal:an.ce of liAs

IIAMC

= average balance of liAs/market capitalisation

OPGROW199 9

= (1989

pretax operating profit + total

amortisation write-offs of liAs - 1988 pretax
operating profit)/1988 pretax operating
profit
OPGROW1990 = (1990 pretax operating profit + total

amortisation write-offs of liAs - 1989 pretax
operating profit)/1989 pretax operating
profit
LIFE

= 1 if the company has any IIA with a limited

legal life, 0 otherwise

= total debentures/total liabilities
INTCOV

= (operating

profit before tax, interest

expenses, total amortisation write-offs of

IIAs)/interest expenses
SIZE

=market capitalisation

Specification analysis using sales revenue:
IIAREV

= average balance of liAs/sales revenue

SIZE

= sales revenue

Specification analysis using total assets:
IIATA

= average balance of IIAs/total assets

SIZE

= total assets
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APPENDIX D
OLS

Reqr~ssion

Results

(Revenue instead of Market Capitalisation)

Dependent Variable: lnAMORT
Variables

Pred.Sign

Coefficient

t-Stat

'p' (two-tailed)

1989 (n = 45)

Constant

+/-

lniiAREV

-2.050

-0.272

0.787

-0.433

-2.270

0.029

eOPGROW

+

0.758

l. 431

0.161

LIFE

+

3.185

3.003

0.005

4.382

l. 212

0.233

DEB0.25
lniNTCOV

+

-0.021

-0.051

0. 960

lnSIZE

+

-0.431

-1.171

0.249

F-Ratio

3.253

estimated R2

(p=.011)
0. 339
1990 (n = 39)

Constant

+I-

lniiAREV

-7.925

-1.093

0.282

-0.475

-2.231

0.033

eOPGROW

+

0.747

1.140

0.263

LIFE

+

2.794

2.392

0.023

2.924

0.569

0.573

DEB0.25
lniNTCOV

+

-0.234

-0.514

0. 611

lnSIZE

+

-o .113

-0.320

0.751

F-Ratio

2.053

estimated R2

(p=.087)
0.278
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APPENDIX E
OLS Regression Results

(Total Assets instead of Market Capitalisation)

Dependent Variable: lnAMORT

Variables

Pred.Sign

Coefficient

t-Stat

'p'{two-tailed)

1989 (n = 45)
Constant

+/-

ln!IATA

-2.509

-0.276

0.784

-o. 416

-2 .101

0.042

eOPGROW

+

0. 777

1.457

0.153

LIFE

+

3.143

2.998

0.005

4. 477

1. 250

0.219

DEB0.25
lniNTCOV

+

-0.014

-0.033

0. 974

lnSIZE

+

-o. 407

-0.936

0. 355.

F-Ratio

3.134

estimated R2

(p=.014)
0.331
1990 (n = 39)

Constant

+I-

lniiATA

~

j
'}

'

i
'!:!

:l

-o. 200

0.843

-0.466

-1. 998

0.054

eOPGROW

+

0.650

0. 992

0.329

LIFE

+

2.848

2. 358

0.025

3.249

0. 632

0.532

DEBO. 25

i

-1.936

lniNTCOV

+

-0.300

-0.642

0.526

lnSIZE

+

-0.391

-0.864

0. 394

F-Ratio

(p=.107)

1. 924

estimated a2

0.265

